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I. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of optimal taxation in a second best-world offers an inte- 
resting possibility to integrate efficiency and equity considerations in 
a coherent framework. Empirical application of the optimal taxation- 
approach is not without its problems, however. Indeed,  when authors 
began actually computing optimal tax schemes, it soon became clear 
that the results of these computations were heavily dependent on the 
choice of functional form for the individual utility functions and the 
resulting demand system (Deaton (1981),(1987))~.  Partly as a conse- 
quence of  this finding, recent empirical work puts more emphasis on 
the welfare evaluation of inarginal tax reform. A straightforward me- 
thodology, based on cost-benefit principles, was proposed and ap- 
plied for India by Ahmad and Stern (1984). The main advantage of 
this approach is its theoretical interpretability. It stays firmly within 
the stylised Walrasian inodel and the effects of  increasing equality 
aversion or increasing price elasticities show up immediately ill the 
results. 
The attractiveness of  this approach has led to analogous calcula- 
tions for the indirect tax structures of  Western European countries 
(Decoster and Schokkaert (1989),(1990), for Belgium; Kaiser and 
Spahn (1989), for West Germany). It can be doubted, however, whether 
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to introduce into the model a system of income taxation and a labour 
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The theoretical structure of  second-best analysis in a non-Walra- 
sian world has been explored in a pathbreaking article by Drhze (1985). 
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the welfare analysis in a straightforward way. A first empirical appli- 
cation of  this approach for Belgium has been presented by Wibaut 
((1987),(1989)). We work further in this direction and present some 
empirical calculations with Belgian data for a linear wage tax and a 
15 commodities-classification of indirect taxes. Our paper differs from 
Wibaut's approach in two respects. 
First, he starts from the assumption that a Keynesian regime pre- 
vails. In his model, the gross wage rate and the producer prices are 
exogenously fixed. In our model, these crucial variables are endoge- 
nized by assuming that the goods markets are in equilibrium and that 
wages are determined within a process of  bargaining between trade 
unions and employers2. This leads to the occurrence of  involuntary 
unemployment. 
Second, in Wibaut's model there is only one aggregate private sec- 
tor, producing the different commodities. Hereby an important source 
of differential impact of taxes is neglected. We calibrate different pro- 
duction technologies for 15 sectors,  which implies that there is a quite 
complex general equilibrium structure underlying our computed mar- 
ginal welfare costs. To illustrate the importance of the general equili- 
brium structure, especially for the direct-indirect taxation debate, 
some simulations using different assumptions on the shifting of  the 
labour tax will be performed. 
The structure of  the paper is as follows. 111 section I1 we present 
the concept of the marginal welfare cost of taxation in a general and 
abstract form. The following sections describe our model of the eco- 
nomy: household behaviour is discussed in section 111, the private pro- 
duction sector in section IV and the labour inarket in section V. Ma- king use of the information available for Belgium, we have estimated 
some parameters of  that model and calibrated the others. The des- 
cription of  these empirical approximations is integrated in the theo- 
retical discussion. All this information is collected in section VI. Re- 
sults for Belgium in the reference year 1980 are reported and discus- 
sed in section VII. Section V111 concludes. 
11. THE MARGINAL WELFARE COST OF  TAXATION 
We define the social welfare function W(z)  and total government re- 
venue S(z) as a function of the vector of endogenous variables 2. 
The content of the vector z will be determined by the choice of so- 
cial welfare function and by the specification of the economy: this spe- 
cification will deternline how the tax rates t i~lfluence  the z-variables. 
Let us remain for the moment at a general and abstract level and re- 
present this model of the economy as 
If the assumptions underlying the implicit function theorem are met, 
it is straightforward to compute from (1) the matrix of tax multipliers: 
(2) 
dt' 
The  problem of optimal taxation is then traditionally written as 
max  W(z)  s.t.  S(z) 2 5 
t 
leading to the first order conditions 
where h stands for the Lagrange-multiplier of  the governlnent reve- 
nue constraint. For reasons described in the introduction, recent empirical work 
centers more on the tax ~efor71z  pl.oble1~1,  which tries to identify a di- 
rection dt such that dW  > 0 (welfare improvement) and dS 2 0 (bud- 
getaly feasibility). A simple and transparent approach to assess the 
desirability of  tax changes has been proposed by Ahmad and Stern 
(1984). They define MC,, the marginal cost in terms of social welfare 
of  an extra unit of revenue raised via the i-th tax rate, as: 
MC;  = 
It is obvious that a!!  these marginal costs will have to be equs!,  i.e., 
MC, =  h, 'di,  for the tax structure to be optimal. Welfare improving re- 
forms can also be detected immediately: if MC,<IMC,, social welfare 
will be increased by lowering the tax rate t, with an offsetting increase 
in the tax t,, so as to keep global tax revenue constant. 
Of course, to give further content to (3) we will have to specify the 
social welfare function and the model (1). For our welfare analysis we 
will  work  with  a traditional welfaristic social welfare function 
w(v',  ...,  vH), where v"  is the indirect utility of household h. Our model 
of the economy will be described in the following sections. We will first 
sketch the model of  household behaviour, then the specification of 
the production sector and finally the labour market assumptions. 
111. COMMODITIES AND HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOUR 
We consider an economy with G commodities, indexed i= 1,  ...,  G,  with 
correspoi~ding  producer pricesp = (p,,...,  indirect taxes t= (t,, ...,  t,) 
and consumer prices q =  (q ,,..., q,),  where 
q =p  + t  (4) 
The first 6-1  commodities are produced by the private sector, where- 
as commodity G is supplied by the government. Furthermore, there 
is a single labour market where the net wage q,  is determined (see Sec- 
tion V). Social security contributiolls and income taxes, captured by 
t,, diive a  wedge between the net wage q, and the wage costp, . Hence, The vector of  tax rates to be included in the welfare analysis consists 
of the indirect taxes and the tax on labour'. 
Household h consulnes a bundlex" = (X';,  ..., X'&), supplies a quan- 
tity of labour l",  receives a net wage q'; and non-wagc income I".  Wage 
differentiation across households results from exogenous differences 
in capability or productivity. captured by the efficiency parameters e", 
such that q';  = e"qP Preferences are represented by a utility function 
LL"  (.p,  -  1'')  with the usual properties. Household h faces a budget con- 
straint 
and a constraint on labour supplys 
l/? = jl'  (L)  (YI?) 
where L stands for aggregate employment in the economy, and Q'' and 
yh  are Lagrange multipliers associated with the respective constraints. 
It is assumed that households willingly supply any demand for labour 
at the going wage, i.e., 
Non-wage income is made up of  an exogenous component p",  a 
share 0" in net private sector profits and unemployment compensa- 
tion: 
where l3  denotes private sector profits, t, the profit tax rate, l*:" the 
full employment level of labour supply and bh  the unemployment be- 
nefit of household h per unit of  unemployme~lt.  The solutio~~  of the 
constrained utility maxi~nizatioil  problem for ho~~sehold  h yields the 
followiilg commodity demand and labour supply functions: Total consumption of commodity j is given by 
X, = c  xJ; 
h 
This total consumption will determine the revenue from indirect taxes. 
Using  (8a]  and (8b) we can derive the indirect utility function 
v"  (B qli, $, 1"). The following properties of  vh  will prove useful: 
Excess supply in the labour market implies that the net wage q'; ex- 
ceeds the reservation wage q'7,  defined as 
The individual indirect utility functions will be introduced in the 
social welfare function W Distributional considerations will be cap- 
tured by the concavity properties of  the social welfare function and 
the individual utility functions. They can be represented by the vec- 
tor p, where 
This can be interpreted as the marginal social value of one unit of 
income accruing to household h. With a utilitarian social welfare func- 
tion and utility functions, which are linear in income, one gets ph = 1, 
V h, i.e.,  distributional considerations are neglected in the welfare eva- 
luation. At the other extreme, a maximin social welfare function would 
imply P"  = 0 for all individuals, except the poorest. 
Empirical application 
The reference year for our application to the Belgian tax system is 
1980~.  For the indirect tax system, we use a 15 commodities-classifi- 
cation. In Table 1  we give an overview of these commodities. The first 
column gives the indirect tax rate (composed of VAT and excises) as 
a percentage of the consumer price and the second column gives the average budget shares in 1980. The tax wedge on labour in the base 
year is taken to be 0.767 and the (fixed) tax rate on profits is taken to 
be 0.50. 
TABLE 1 
Cornn~odzry  classzficntzoiz 
t: indirect lax rate (VAT+excises) as a percentage of consuliler price; 
S: budget share; 
e,:  total expenditure elz~sticity; 
e;,: u~lcolnpensated  own price elasticity; 
e,: elasticity with respcct to rationing variable. 
,  I  I  I  I 
;l.(*')  i~idicates  that thc estiniatcd coefficient is greater t6an (twice) its standard error 
services (SERV) 
To estimate the revenue from indirect taxes, we need information 
on aggregate consumer behaviour allowing us to predict the effect of 
changes in the consumer prices on total consumption X. For this pur- 
1.9  ,059  0.95:;:"  -0.43-  -0.01 pose we have estimated a con~plete  demand system for 1953-1988  with 
National Accounts data, taking into account rationing on the labour 
market. We coinpared the results for the Rotterdam, AIDS and CBS- 
specifications and finally preferred the Rotterdam functional formS. 
The rationing variable is defined as yearly effective man-hours per ca- 
pita, and hence captures the effect of variations in hours as well as in 
the rate of  unemployment9.  A likelihood ratio test indicated that in- 
cluding the rationing variable in the demand system increased the fit 
significantly. To introduce the estimated information in the tax ana- 
lysis, all estimates of behavioural reactions have been expressed in 
terms of  elasticities and the levels of all variables were calculated (and 
made consistent) for the year 1980. The last three columns of Table 1 
give the inco~ne  elasticities, uncompensated own price elasticities and 
elasticities with respect to the rationingvariable. all evaluated for 1980. 
The evaluation of the marginal welfare cost of the various taxes with 
a welfaristic and individualistic social welfare function requires addi- 
tional, ho~~sehold  specific informatlolz on consumption, employment, 
profit share, unemployment benefit, reservation wage and the effi- 
ciency parameters. For our empirical exercise we consider ten house- 
holds, corresponding to the deciles of  the Belgian consumer budget 
survey. This survey gives us immediately the data on disposable income 
and consumption: income data are given in the first column of Table 
2. On the basis of the budget survey, we can also easily calculate the 
profit shares eh,  shown in the second column of the table. The reser- 
vation wages are taken to be equal to zero"'. 
The most difficult part of the exercise was the construction of em- 
ployment and efficiency data: these had to be consistent with the pro- 
duction side of the  model. Startingfrom the  given distribution ofunem- 
ployment over the deciles and assuming that full time-employment was 
proportional to the number of active people in the decile'l, we could 
derive employment and wage figures from the (given) data on total 
labour income. Resulting unemployinent figures and household effi- 
ciency parameters are given in the third and fourth column of Table 2 
respectively. The same calibration procedure also yields the level of 
the unemployment benefits of the different deciles and the efficiency 
parameters for the different production sectors. We will return to these 
efficiency pal-ameters in the following section. TABLE 2 
Ii7fo1nzntlon nbout lzo~~seholds 
1  decile  1  disposable income  1  B'  1 unen~ployment  l  eh  1 
8":  share of dec~le  in total profits (computed on the basis of the Budget Survey): 
eh:  calibrated efficiency parameter. 
The  value judgments incorporated in the parameters P" should also 
be made explicit. These are derived from the traditional iso-elastic 
form of the social welfare function and normalized such that the weight 
of the poorest decile equals one (see also Ahmad and Stern (1984)). 
This yields 
where ,.:K/z  denotes total ilzcome per equivalent adultl%f  house- 
hold h and E represents the inequality aversion parameter. We will do 
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter E. IV. THE  PRODUCTION SIDE OF  THE  ECONOMY 
We assume that prices clear the G-1  private goods markets. The go- 
vernment sector sets its price and then supplies what is demanded by 
the other agents in the economy. There is involuntary unemployment 
since a non-market clearing wage is determined through bargaining 
between employers and trade unions. 
Theprivnte sector.  j first decides on the allocation of total consump- 
tionxj over imported and domestically produced goods. We follow the 
standard procedure in general equilibrium modeling (see, e.g., De 
Me10 and Robinson (1985)) and treat each commodity,u, as a compo- 
site good which is a function of two varieties: the imported variety m, 
with producer price pm, and the domestic variety d, with producer 
pricepdJ. The constrained cost minimization poblem 
yields the following results: 
Final delnand of domestically produced sector  j-goods then equals 
the sum of domestic demand dl and exports exl(pd,, a), where co is an 
exogenous (and fixed) indicator of  demand conditions on the world 
market. 
Gross output of sector j requires the input of imported resources I; 
with pricey, (the numkraire) and of  labour l with wage cost ep,, where 
eJ is a sector-specific efficiency parametefi3. Total output ); is assu- 
med to be a Leontief function of gross output and of domestically pro- 
duced intermediate goods purchased at a pricepd, ,  i= 1,  ...,  G. Profits 
of sector j call then be defined as 
llj = pdJyj -  ejp,lJ -p,. . r; -  C yd,ni,yi 
i 
(13) 
where A = [a,,] is the matrix of fixed input-output coefficients. Profit maximization yields the following output supply and input demand 
functions: 
I, = 1,  (pd,  P,, ep,) 
where  stands for the intermediate goods demand by sector j of the 
commodity produced by sector i. We also have the following market 
:l::  A::  X- I  /1  1 
GyuIIIuIIuIII LulIuILIuIIS IUl J -  1,...,u-L 
(,-l 
Y,(.) = d,(.)  + exl(Pd,  W)  + ~,,YG  + c Q]/Y,  (.) 
k  (15) 
where yj(.) and y,(.)  are the functions defined in (14a), dj(.)  is the func- 
tion defined in (12), and y,  is production by the government sector. 
The  gove~nmerzt  sets the price p,  of commodity G, and production 
y,  is determined by demand: final demand by households, exports and 
intermediate demand by private producers 
YC; = C-x%(qJ  qt  1"s  1")  + ex,@,  4 + C  QGY] ipd,p1,  epl)  (16) 
h  I 
Note that this good is delivered to households by domestic produ- 
cers only. Government production requires the input of labour, iin- 
ported resources and domestically produced intermediate goods. Cost 
minimisation then leads to the following input demand functions: 
Empirical applicatioll 
Since the classification of cominodities at the consumer side is not the 
same as the sectoral classification at the production side, a transition matrix was needed to link both sides. We therefore made use of the 
work performed by Van Regemorter (1990). Even then, we lack suffi- 
cient information at the sectoral level to estimate all behavioural reac- 
tions. We therefore resorted to a calibration of the parameters. A part 
of the relevant information is shown in Table 3. Note that "railways" 
(closely linked to public transportation in the consumer commodity 
classification) is the public sector commodity. The last columls of Ta- 
ble 3 gives the efficiency parameters, calibrated so as to be consistent 
with the employment levels and the efficiency parameters for the in- 
dividual households. 
TABLE 3 
Pinductloiz  side of tlze ecorzorny 
production sector 
agriculture 
I chemical sector  I  5.49  /  0.52  1  1.28  1 
energy 
metals 
/  manufacturing of transportation equipment  1  2.01  1  0.44  1  1.14  1 
CS, 
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0.91 We assume that the allocation of consumer demand over domestic 
and imported varieties is based on cost minimization and that each 
composite commodity can be represented as a CES-aggregate of these 
varieties. The problem then can be written as 
and the functional form for (12) becomes 
(i -oij-l 
a.  1-Gi 
p, = (a,  'pm,  + (l -  nippdilai) 
where o, = 1/(1 + p,)  is the elasticity of substitution between the im- 
ported and the domestic variety of commodity i. Values for these elas- 
ticities were taken from the study by Shiells, Stern and Deardorf (1986) 
and, if  not available from that source, were taken to be 1. An over- 
view of these figures is given in the first column of Table 3. Given these 
values of o,,  the share parameters a,  and all relevant elasticities could 
be calibrated for the base year 1980. The elasticities of exports with 
respect to prices are all put equal to -1. 
The technology of the productio~l  sectors is represented by a Leon- 
tief function in domestically produced intermediate goods and in gross 
output (denoted byyg!), the latter being a CES-function of labour, ca- 
pital and imported resources, i.e., 
where vi = 1/(1 + pi) is the elasticity of  substitution in production, 
assumed to be the same for any pair of inputs. Our theoretical model 
keeps capital fixed. This implies that within our calibration exercise we have to draw a distinction between the long run (with flexible ca- 
pital) and the short run (with fixed capital). The share parameters of 
the complete CES-function are calibrated such that primary input de- 
mand by the various sectors can be explained exhaustively for the base 
year 1980. Otherwise stated, we assumed that the primary factor use 
in 1980 corresponds to a long run equilibrium and hence solved the 
followi~~g  optimization problem, where y,  is the given level of produc- 
tion: 
s.t. aOyi  = ygi (k,  1,  r;) 
Again, for given values of the elasticities of substitution vi, the first 
order conditions can be used to calibrate the other parameters. Our 
estimates of these elasticities are based on the results reported in Bal- 
lard et al. (1985) and Dixon et al. (1982). They are given in the se- 
cond column of Table 3. 
In the short run, however, with a fixed capital stock (L,),  private sec- 
tor behaviour is described by profit maximization: 
s.t.  y, =  (l,, 7; k,) 
no; 
The solution of this problem, together with the calibrated parame- 
ters of the production function, then yields empirically identified sup- 
ply and variable input demand functions. The elasticities derived from 
these functions have been used in the tax calculations. 
As to the public sector (railways), we assume that the government 
aims at producing a given, demand determined production level at mi- 
nimal cost: from which the variable input demand functions can be derived in an 
analogous way. 
V.  THE LABOUR MARKET 
While we have assumed clearing goods markets (15), we feel that 
wages react more slowly to changing economic conditions and we want 
to incorporate the possibility of involuntary unemployment. We there- 
fore assume that a non-market clearing wage is determined through 
bargaining between trade unions and employers. More concretely, we 
resort to what is known as the "right to manage" model in the liter- 
ature on trade union behaviour. In this framework, which has been 
elaborated by Nickel and Andrews (1983) and by Hoe1 and Nymoen 
(1988), the firm sets employment unilaterally but the firm and the 
union together bargain over the wage rate. 
Our knowledge on the characteristics of the actual process of wage 
bargaining is rather limited. We therefore have opted for a very gene- 
ral specification. In De Bruyne and Van Rompuy (1991) it is shown 
that centralized wage bargaining between the union and the federa- 
tion of employers results in the following structural wage equation: 
where qc = &,qi  stands for the consumption price index, si  being the 
1 
average budget share of commodity i. It is obvious that our empirical 
results will crucially depend on the specification used to give opera- 
tional content to (18). In section V11.C we will compare the results 
for different specificatioils of this wage equation. 
Empirical application 
The reference values for the elasticity of the net wage with respect to 
its various determinants are taken from the empirical study for Bel- 
gium of Van Rompuy, De Bruyne and Van de Voorde (1988) and are 
given in the first column of Table 4. The second column of Table 4 con- 
tains the elasticities for the case where the tax on labour has no effect 
on the wage cost, i.e., is shifted fully on the net (consumer) wage. The 
third column gives the elasticities for the opposite extreme case, where 
the net wage remains constant and the full burden of  the tax  on labour falls on the wage cost. These three possibilities will be compa- 
red in section VI1.C. 
TABLE 4 
Elastlcltles of the wage eqziatzon 
I  elasticity of the net wage with respect to  I  reference  I  shifting on  I  shifting on  I 
profits 
Reference values are taken from Van Rompuy, De Bruyne, Van de Voorde (1988) 
cost of living index 
VI. COLLECTING THE INFORMATION 
0.2750 
We can now derive for the model, described in the previous sections, 
the budget surplus (or deficit) of the government S: 
I tax on labour 
l  1  -0.4410  /  -0.7056  /  0.0000  1 
0.6900 
h 
Revenues derive from indirect taxes on final demand, the tax on 
labour income, the tax on profits and the operating surplus of govern- 
ment production. Expenditures consist of unemployment allowances 
and an (exogenously given) amount of public good provision G. Total 





0.6900  0.6900 where I,  is a vector with all elements equal to zero except the G-th 
one which is unity, and 
is the change in the public sector surplus due to a change in that 
sector's output. 
We can also elaborate the social welfare term along the same lines. 
Making use of (7),  (9), (10) and (11) we can derive 
As diswssed iii DrCzc ((1985),(1987)), Drkze and Stern (1987) and 
Van de  gaer, Schokkaert and De  Bruyne (1993), equation (21) can be 
related in an intuitive way to the traditional objectives of  economic 
policy: inflation14, income growth (where labour and profit income 
are taken separately), employment. The use of the P vector makes it 
possible to integrate distributional considerations and macroecono- 
mic objectives in a consistent welfarist framework. 
Equations (20) and (21) give a more concrete content to the ele- 
ments in the marginal welfare cost formula (3). The model in the pre- 
vious sections is a concrete example of F (z, t) =0 in (1). The vector 
of endogenous variables z consists of  (X, q, L, I-I, p,  q, pd). The effect 
of changes in the tax instruments on these variables can be found by 
solving the (linearised form) of the complete model, as given in (2). 
VII. RESULTS 
To get a better insight into the structure of the results with respect to 
the marginal welfare cost of taxation, it is useful to look first at some 
elements of the matrix of tax multipliers (dzldt'), as given in eq. (2). 
In Table 5,  we give the multipliers of the (own) consumer prices, the 
government budget, profits and employment with respect to changes 
in the tax rates. Cross-effects on prices are negligible for the indirect 
tax rates. It is obvious that there are important differences between 
the effects of different tax rates on  the government budget and on em- 
ployment and profits. An increase in the tax rate on tobacco, for in- stance, hardly increases government revenue. The most striking fea- 
ture of  the results, however, is that producer prices and wage costs 
are nearly fixed. While this is often stated as an assumptio~l  in tax cal- 
culations, in our case it follows from the solution of our complete ge- 
neral equilibrium model1'. 
TABLE 5 
I  TAX RATE  I  MULTIPLIER EFFECT ON  I 
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3365317 A. Reszrlts for  E = 1.5 
Table 6 shows the results for a case of  intermediate inequality aver- 
sion E = 1.5 (a reasonable value, if one believes the argumentation in 
Stern (1977)). The upper part of the table gives the values calculated 
TABLE 6 
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LABO  TOBA  PUBT  LIGH for (3) and the breakdown according to the four terms in (21). As ar- 
gued before, these terms correspond to inflation, labour income, pro- 
fit income and employment respectively. The lower part of the table 
ranks the different taxes according to their overall marginal welfare 
cost and according to their effect on the relevant variables of the so- 
cial welfare function. 
The results speak for themselves. A welfare improving tax reform 
could consist of  a lowering of tax rates for tobacco, lighting and be- 
verages with a compensating increase for public transportation, ser- 
vices and personal care. The marginal welfare cost of taxing tobacco 
is particularly high. To understand this result, one should take into ac- 
count the high excises currently existing in Belgium for tobacco and 
alcoholic beverages (see Table 1). These excises are probably justi- 
fied by external effects 9:  merit good c~nsiderations.  Since we have 
completely neglected (de)merit effects in our analysis, it is not sur- 
prising that this analysis leads to the result that the existing taxes on 
tobacco are too high16. One should also remember that public trans- 
portation is the public sector good, appearing directly in the govern- 
ment budget constraint (19) and (20). 
A comparison of the different columns in Table 6 immediately shows 
that the overall ranking of welfare costs is dominated by the consump- 
tion price effect. This was to be expected since consumption prices 
are immediately and directly affected by a change in indirect taxes. 
Only two adjustments are needed to go from the ranking in the infla- 
tion column to the ranking of the total costs. The tax on food switches 
with the tax on heating, due to the effect on  profits. The tax on labour 
is costly mainly because its effect on net wages. However, the obser- 
vation of a high correlation between the welfare costs and their infla- 
tion components does not mean that the calculation of  the general 
equilibrium effects does not matter: the marginal welfare costs heavi- 
ly depend on the budget effects and it has already been shown in Ta- 
ble 5 that these strongly differ for different commodities. 
B. The  effects of changing E 
Table 7 gives the results for the marginal welfare costs for different 
values of  E.  It is remarkable that the taxes on tobacco, lighting and 
beverages have a relatively high marginal welfare cost, whatever the 
degree of inequality aversion. This implies that there can almost be 
consensus about the welfare improving effect of  a decrease in these tax rates (if one neglects the externality component mentioned in the 
previous subsection). 
TABLE 7 
Senslhvzfy nllnlysls wztlz  respect to E: rankings and welfare costs 
For other commodities there are important changes, however, and 
they go in the expected direction. A higher degree of inequality aver- 
sion leads to a relative increase in the marginal welfare cost of taxing 
heating, food and rent and to a relative decrease in the welfare cost 
of taxing private transportation (both purchases and use) and labour. 
The divergence between the results for private transportation and hea- 
ting points to the difficulties attached to an overall policy of  energy 
taxation. 
C. The importance of  the process of  wage formation 
Tables 6 and 7 seem to suggest that increasing the tax on labour would 
entail a relatively low welfare cost. This may seem surprising, as it goes 
directly against the widely heard opinion that Belgium should reo- 
rient its tax structure partly from direct to indirect taxation. Our con- 
clusion has to be interpreted carefully, however. Indeed, it depends 
crucially on the assumptions made about tax shifting in the wage for- mation process. Consider the three possible cases summarized in Ta- 
ble 4. The first column gives the elasticities for the reference solutio~l 
as described in the previous tables. The second reflects the assump- 
tion that the tax on labour is fully shifted on the net wage. The third 
implements the other extreme assumption that the burden of the la- 
bour tax is borne completely by the wage cost. 
Changing the assumptions about the shifting of  the labour tax in 
the wage formation process of  course has no influence at all on the 
welfare cost of the various indirect tax rates, but only matters for the 
relative ranking of  the labour tax itself. This relative ranking for the 
different shifting assumptions is shown in Figure 1. It is clear that the 
(relative) welfare cost of taxing labour is much higher when the tax 
burden falls on the wage cost. In the latter case, we have strong ef- 
fects aii emp~oymeiii  and profits, as shown by the relevant multipliers 
in Table 8. Therefore the increase in government revenue is much lo- 
wer in this case. These general equilibrium effects largely dominate 
the direct net wage-component in the social welfare calculations. 
FIGURE 1 
Rankzrzg of tlze welfare cost of the lnbou~  tax 
net wage 
reference 
wage cost TABLE  S 
Gei~etnl  eq~izlib~z~im  m~~ltlplzers  of the tnx 071  lnbozrr 
EFFECT ON: 
net wage 
It then turns out that the characteristics of the wage formation pro- 
cess are crucial to evaluate the trade-off between direct and indirect 
taxes. At present, our knowledge of this process is rather limited. More 








In this paper, we presented a general theoretical framework that ena- 
bled us to evaluate marginal tax reforms, thereby integrating macroe- 
conomic objectives and normative judgements. The crucial and novel 
feature of  our approach is the modelling of  endogenous wages and 
producer prices, and the introduction of taxes on labour income. Pri- 
ces clear the goods markets and wages result from a bargaining pro- 
cess between trade unions and employers, capturing at least one po- 
tential reason for the occurrence of involuntary unemployment. Some 
interesting results are worthwhile recapitulating. 
First, for a subset of indirect taxes, the ranking of the marginal wel- 
fare costs is robust and rather illsensitive to the degree of inequality 
aversion. As a consequence, there certainly exist welfare improving 
marginal tax reforms on which people with different normative judg- 
ments can easily reach a consensus. 
Second, our analysis has pointed out the importance of tax shifting 
in the process of wage determination. The welfare ranking of a tax on 
labour income versus an extensive set of  indirect tax rates is highly 
dependent on this degree of tax shifting. This implies that considera- 
bly more attention should be devoted to the aspect of  wage forma- 
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3 365 317 
Shifting on net wage 
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1 319 333 tion, especially if  one wants to take a stand in the debate on the opti- 
mal mix of direct and indirect taxes. In the present state of our empi- 
rical knowledge, it is difficult to answer the question whether a shift 
from direct to indirect taxes would be welfare-improving. 
Third, for the indirect taxes we found a high correlation between 
the rankings of the marginal welfare costs and of their inflation com- 
ponents. The "employment"-component in the marginal welfare cost 
is rather small and does not vary much over the different commodi- 
ties. Therefore the effects on unemployment seem to be a less impor- 
tant factor in the determination of the optimal indirect tax structure. 
Of course, the data being what they are, caution is needed with the 
interpretation of  these results. Many questions can be raised con- 
cerning the empirical application, which we have documented quite 
nutnn,;,  ,,,,,,,,~e!ji  :n  .  this paper. S~metimes  cur calibratier, has beer, nuite  Y 
ad hoc. The effective profit tax rate is certainly lower than the one 
that we used in our simulations; the importance of the objectives other 
than inflation might become more important in case this profit tax rate 
is lowered. The same holds for the construction of household specific 
data on efficiency parameters, employment and unemploylnent be- 
nefits since these are crucial in determining the weight attached to the 
employment and labour income objectives in the welfare function. 
More empirical (and data collection) work is needed to improve the 
reliability of our findings. 
There are also some remaining theoretical weaknesses. (De)merit 
good effects have been neglected. The static character of  our exer- 
cise (with capital fixed) is a severe limitation. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to replace our assumption of market clearing prices with 
the more general assumption of price setting behaviour, possibly lin- 
ked with a more elaborate model of international competition at home 
and in foreign markets. It is not a priori obvious that the general equi- 
librium tax multipliers for such more general model would be similar 
to the ones presented in this paper. 
For all these reasons we emphasize that it would be dangerous to 
draw immediately strong policy conclusions from our analysis. Howe- 
ver, we feel that our approach shows an interesting way to integrate 
macroeconomic and welfare considerations into tax analysis. More- 
over, our analysis offers clear suggestions about the priorities for further 
empirical research. NOTES 
1. The basic reason for this problem is that one needs the functional forms to simulate 
situations which may be far removed from the range of actual observations. 
2.  The case of clearing goods markets with a labour market in disequilibrium has already 
been analysed by Drkze (1985) and by Marchand, Pestieau and Wibaut (1989). In their 
model, however, the wage is fixed. Van de gaer, Schokkaert and De  Bruyne ((1992),(1993)) 
compare the results for different general equilibrium specifications of the economy and 
show that the specification of the general equilibrium model has a crucial influence on 
the marginal welfare costs. 
3.  The price of imported resources (to be introduced later) is the numeraire. 
4.  Later in the analysis we will also introduce a profit tax with a rate t,.  This profit tax rate 
is kept fixed and not included in the welfare analysis. 
5. We assume that changes in total employment continuously affect the employment of 
all household (see also Dr&ze  (1985)). It would have been more realistic, but analyti- 
cally less convenient, to assume that some households become fully unemployed while 
others keep a full-time job. 
6.  For the empirical application we have to combine data oil household behaviour and on 
the input-output-structure of the economy. The pear 1980 is the most recent year for 
which this is possible. 
7. This is the figure used by the Belgian Planning Office. Note that the tax wedge in our 
model includes the social security contributions. 
8. All estimations were made with the DEMMOD-computer program, constructed by A.P. 
Barten. The differences between Rotterdam and CBS were rather small, while with 
AIDS there were problems with the negativity of the Slutsky-matrix. See Decoster and 
Schokkaert (1990) for a comparison of the results of tax reform analyses with the dif- 
ferent demand systems. 
9.  Our  definition of the rationing variable differs from the one used by Wibaut (1987), in 
that he uses the number of hours per employed person, thereby neglecting changes in 
employment. 
10. Even then, it will turn out that the employment component plays only a minor role in 
the welfare evaluation of the different tax rates. 
11. Of course, for this exercise we considered the unemployed as active. As non-active were 
considered the retired people, the invalids, the conscripts. 
12. We use the equivalence scales from the Consumer Budget Survey. 
13. Capital is fixed in our model: however, there are possibilities  of substitution in pro- 
duction between labour and imported resources. 
14. It is perhaps solnewhat confi~sing  to talk about inflation in a model without money.  What 
we basically observe is an index of changes in relative prices, where the numeraire good 
is imported resources. 
15. This does not imply that the assumption of price flexibility foes not influence the re- 
sults and that we could as well have stuck to a Wibaut-type model: the increased price 
flexibility has a strong impact on profits and on the revenue effects of the tax changes 
(see Van de gaer. Schokkaert and De  Bruyne (1993)). 
16. In Decoster and Schokkaert (1989), an attempt has been made to integrate these ef- 
fects into a marginal reform analysis of the Belgian tax system. 
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